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 Accounting for poverty: From attribution to discourse 
 
Abstract 
In this article it is argued that the attributional literature concerning explanations of poverty is 
inadequate due to its theoretical presuppositions.  It is proposed that a discursive approach is 
better able to withstand criticism and contribute to a more adequate understanding of poverty 








There has now been over two decades of research into the explanation of poverty following 
Feagin's (1972) classic study of Americans' explanations for domestic poverty.  Over that time an 
attributional paradigm has predominated in the poverty explanation literature.  It will be argued 
here that the dominance of this approach has had the effect both of constraining the questions 
posed by research and of failing to provide evidence useful in social and political action against 
poverty.  This article will not aim to provide an in-depth review of this literature since adequate 
reviews exist (Furnham, 1988; Furnham and Lewis, 1986) -- instead a brief overview will 
suffice.   
The research context:  attributions for poverty 
Feagin (1972) interviewed 1,017 Americans and asked them to rate a number of possible causes 
of poverty.  He categorised these responses as individualistic (blaming poverty on dispositional 
factors within poor people), fatalistic (blaming poverty on fate or bad luck) or structural 
(blaming poverty on society).  In the last twenty years similar research has been conducted in a 
number of countries: Australia (Feather, 1974); Barabados and Dominica (Payne and Furnham, 
1985); Canada (Lamarche and Tougas, 1979); India (Pandey, Sinha, Prakash and Triparthi, 1982; 
Sinha, Jain and Pandey, 1980; Singh and Vasudeva, 1977); and the UK (Furnham, 1982).  In 
1992 Gallup/Social Surveys Ltd  published a series of polls examining British explanations for 
domestic poverty finding that a majority blamed environmental ('circumstances') rather than 
individualistic ('effort') factors (52% and 12% respectively) and that the percentage favouring 
individualistic explanations had decreased over recent years although 34% agreed that poverty 
was due to both.  This appeared to show that fewer individualistic explanations were given than 
in the 1977 EEC survey (Commission of the European Communities, 1977) which reported that 
Britain  had the largest number of respondents blaming poverty on 'laziness and lack of 
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willpower' (43% compared to an EEC average of 25%).  According to this study, Britain was 
below average in ascribing poverty to injustice in society and to luck and nearer the average in 
blaming poverty on 'progress in the modern world'.  A more recent study (Gallup/Social Surveys 
Ltd 1994) found that 15% of people in the UK ascribed the causes of poverty to individualistic 
factors whereas 42% ascribed  the causes to 'injustice in our society'.    
 
A wide range of demographic variables have been reported to influence the kinds of explanations 
people give for poverty including political preference (Commission of the European 
Communities Report, 1977; Furnham, 1982; Griffin and Ohenebasakyi, 1993:  Pandey et al, 
1982; Zucker and Weiner, 1993); nationality (Commission of the European Communities Report, 
1977; Feather, 1974; Lamarche and Tougas, 1979; Payne and Furnham, 1985); and income 
(Feagin, 1972; Feather, 1974; Singh and Vasudeva, 1977; Sinha, Jain and Pandey, 1980).  
 
On the whole, these studies have been interested in the explanations people give for domestic 
poverty rather than poverty abroad.  Three recent investigations, however, have considered 
perceptions of the so-called Third World1 by First World citizens.  Furnham and Gunter (1989) 
examined British adolescents' attitudes to developing countries and found that a majority agreed 
they had unfavourable climates, high population growth, unstable governments and suffered 
exploitation by rich minorities.  A minority agreed that these countries had been exploited by 
developed countries and that their colonial past had held back development.  These researchers 
noted age and gender differences but reported no other related variables. 
 
In a similar study, Harper, Wagstaff, Newton and Harrison (1990) reported on the factor 
structure of a Causes of Third World Poverty Questionnaire (CTWPQ) - similar to that used by 
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Feagin (1972) -- and its relationship with the Just World Scale (Rubin and Peplau, 1975), an 
instrument which attempts to measure the extent to which an individual holds a belief that the 
world is a just place.  Harper et al (1990) found that the most popular explanations for poverty 
included the inefficiency of Third World governments, exploitation by other countries and 
climate.  A factor analysis of the results, reported four factors similar to those of Feagin (1972): 
'Blame the Poor'; 'Blame Third World Governments'; 'Blame Nature'; and 'Blame Exploitation'.  
They reported a significant relationship between the 'Blame the Poor' and 'Blame Third World 
Governments' factors of the CTWPQ and the 'Pro Just World'  factor of the Just World Scale 
(Rubin and Peplau, 1975).  A re-analysis of the data noted that high Just World believers were 
significantly less likely to agree that Third World poverty was due to exploitation by other 
countries, war or the world economic and banking system (Harper and Manasse, 1992). 
 
Surprisingly, little of this empirical literature connects with theories of justice (although Cohen 
and Greenberg, 1982 is a notable exception) or with ideas about why people might make such 
attributions.  One framework which has permeated empirical research is Lerner's (1975, 1980, 
1981) desert theory of justice.  He has argued that justice is a recognition of a relation between a 
person's fate and 'that to which he or she is entitled -- what is deserved' (Lerner, 1981, p.12).  
Lerner argues that people make a preconscious perceptual link between reward and virtue.  Thus 
even a chance reward is interpreted by others as having been merited -- an example of the 
'fundamental attribution error'.  Similarly, those who suffer misfortune are perceived to have 
somehow deserved this fate.  According to Lerner there is a pervasive human need to believe in a 
just world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get.  The motivation for 
such a belief is the maintenance of a stable organisational information-processing framework 
through which the environment is perceived.  Thus the perception of who is entitled to what 
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'appears as an intrinsic part of the way people organise their experiences and respond to their 
environment' (Lerner, 1981, p.33).  The Just World theory has led to a wide variety of empirical 
studies but in their review Furnham and Procter (1989) have argued that the concept is multi-
dimensional and that the world is not simply just and unjust but is also random. 
 
The theoretical inadequacy of attributional poverty research 
In recent years the attribution paradigm has come under sustained attack.  A number of authors,  
including Parker (1989) have noted a number of problematic theoretical presuppositions in 
attribution research in general.  Here I will focus on four themes which are common to most 
critiques of attributional theory and methods. 
 
i.  Individualism 
A pervasive individualism characterises much of the poverty-explanation literature.  There are 
different varieties of individualism but in this literature it is the individual as explainer which is 
the unit of analysis.  This leads to two related effects.  First it assumes that individuals' accounts 
are unitary and internally consistent which is open to question, empirically.  Certainly, in terms 
of pencil and paper tests Schuman and Presser (1981) have noted that even slight changes in the 
wording and context of questions can lead to great differences in subject responses.  Second it 
means that organisational explanations are not examined.  As a result a whole area of potential 
research materials like government press releases, ministerial statements, political manifestos, 
multinational corporation annual reports and so on are ignored.  Moreover political and ethical 
ideologies implicit, for example, in the belief in a Just World literature (eg Conservatism, 
Liberalism, Socialism, equity and so on) are reduced to individualistic concepts of attributional 
style (eg Furnham and Procter, 1989).  In one sense however, this individualism is a false one 
 
 7 
since most of the studies compare group means rather than individual scores in an attempt to 
define abstract factors.    
 
ii. Stability 
Another problem with attributional accounts is that they assume the existence of underlying 
attributional structures which remain stable over time and across situations, with the importance 
of results being judged by the strength of correlations or weightings of abstract items.  If 
relationships between attributions are not as researchers expect them to be this is not because the 
hypothesised structures are inaccurate but because research participants are 'unable to 
distinguish' them (Heaven, 1994).   Such variability causes problems for traditional attribution 
researchers who have to propose complex multi-dimensional attribution models or claim lack of 
cross-cultural validity in order to explain varied results (Furnham and Procter, 1989).  Even 
research like that of Heaven (1994) and Muncer and Gillen (1995) which attempts to examine the 
complexity of explanations still rests on an essentially stable abstract causal network. 
 
iii. Constructed nature 
A third difficulty with traditional research is that items and factors are taken out of their context 
and examined individually.  As Heaven (1994) has noted this over-simplifies how people make 
explanations since causes are often interconnected.  Furnham, a major contributor to the 
literature on this topic, has noted that explanations for poverty may be used variably both by 
different groups of subjects and according to which poor 'target group' is specified (Furnham, 
1982).  However, people may not only use different explanations for different target groups but 
also in different contexts.  The factor analysis by Harper et al (1990) found that many of the 
items of the CTWPQ, for example those relating to 'natural' causes (like climate) loaded on a 
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number of factors (see Table 1).  Whilst this might suggest merely that these items lack 
discrimination, I  
                                                                                                                                                  
 Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
would argue that one hypothesis is that 'natural' explanations for poverty have the flexibility to 
be used together with victim-blaming and other types of explanations.   
 
iv. Neglecting the effects of explanations 
A final problem with attributional poverty research is a startling lack of curiosity about what 
effects and functions these kinds of explanations might have.  Most studies find relationships 
between demographic factors and individual explanations but there is little attempt to explain 
further.  Lerner's (1980) account is motivational and is largely individualistic, having recourse to 
a restricted range of relatively straightfoward rational and non-rational motivational strategies.  
As some writers have noted what is lacking in such accounts is a clear understanding of the role 
of ideology in structuring our views of the world since explanations have ideological effects. 
 
In ignoring such difficulties, traditional attributional research on poverty explanations has been 
essentially conservative in its theory and methodology and has failed to deliver findings which 
might be of use in acting politically and socially against poverty.  One might ask what the use is 
of focusing twenty years of research on the explanations of individual members of the public 
who have no control over world economic resources as opposed to governments and trans-
national corporations who do?  In this respect attributional research has made an ironic 
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'fundamental attribution error' in focusing on the explanations of individuals.  What kind of 
psychological approach could attempt to avoid these kinds of problems?  I want to argue here 
that the turn to discourse offers a way foward. 
 
A discursive approach 
Recent work in rhetorical psychology and discourse analysis (DA) suggests that talk is oriented 
to perform certain functions although this is not necessarily a planned or deliberate process 
(Potter, Edwards and Wetherell, 1993).  When talk is analysed it is possible to elucidate abstract 
discourses (Parker, 1992a) or 'interpretive repertoires' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  Edwards 
and Potter (1992) have described a number of ways in which speakers use rhetorical strategies to 
make what they are saying appear factual -- often when there is some disagreement about the 
facts and when the speaker has a stake in the outcome.  Speakers position themselves and others 
by using such discourses tactically (although, again, this is not necessarily an intentional process) 
and are positioned by those same discourses since certain linguistic resources impose constraints 
on what can be said. 
 
It is important to emphasise however that discursive approaches are not homogenous and there 
are wide differences of view on central issues like reality and the ideological functions and 
effects of accounts.  For Burman and Parker (1993) and Parker (1992a) reality is an important 
focus since power relations have real effects on people.  Adopting a critical realist stance as they 
do means seeing reality not as an independently existing objective conception in a naïve sense 
but as a domain of institutional power relations.  By contrast, Edwards and Potter (1992) are less 
concerned with 'reality' and more with how different accounts are made to seem real.  Curt 
(1994) on the other hand worries about the desirability of competing accounts all claiming to be 
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real, proposing the need for a critical polytextuality.   Parker (1992a) claims that DA does not 
necessarily entail examining the ideological effects of discourse but argues that it should do.  He 
asserts that ideology should be understood not as a belief system or as something 'untrue' but as a 
description of relationships and effects.  On the other hand Potter, Wetherell, Gill and Edwards 
(1990) argue against what they see as a tendency to reify discourses as ideological objects, 
asserting that this misses the variability of use in specific contexts.  This point is developed 
further by Wetherell and Potter (1992) when they emphasise the importance of a focus on 
ideological practice and ideological effects rather than ideologies per se.  Here I will be focusing 
on the ideological effects of certain discourses of poverty-explanation.  My intention here is not 
to offer a cognitive or intentionalist account of poverty explanations but, in describing the effects 
of these explanations I will be arguing that they serve certain ideological interests.  In this 
respect the argument here is probably closer to critical realism than, say, Edwards and Potter 
(1992).  
 
The relationship between interest and talk is a central topic  in discursive psychology  (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992) in that  'the invocation of stake and interest is understood as a rhetorical 
strategy but not as a motivational explanation for rhetorical moves' (Madill and Doherty, 1994, 
p.269, emphasis in original).  Here, however, I will be using the notion of interest differently to 
point out that the effect of certain explanations in certain contexts is to serve particular 
ideological interests. This means moving beyond the text and entails a political commitment on 
the part of the researcher  (Burman, 1991; Burman and Parker, 1993; Parker, 1992a). 
 
Does DA avoid the problems associated with attribution theory?  Discourse analysts do not 
assume that individual explainers produce internally consistent accounts, rather there is an 
 
 11 
assumption of discursive variability: it is expected that people will use different explanations at 
different times (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  Edelman (1977) and Billig and colleagues (Billig, 
Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley, 1988) have argued such variation is common in 
talk about poverty.  One of the problems with paper and pencil survey designs is that they lack 
the ability to examine the dynamics of explanations, for example, to see if people give different 
explanations at different times.  From Table 1 we can see that some items from Harper et al's 
(1990) CTWPQ, including popular 'natural' explanations, do not load uniquely and significantly 
on orthogonal factors.  This suggests that some explanations may be used flexibly in association 
with others.  Moreover, research consistently shows that people agree with many explanations 
for poverty and thus have access to a rich pool of explanations choosing to dip into different 
pools at different moments (to borrow a metaphor from Marshall and Raabe, 1993).   Billig et al 
(1988) note that often 'contrary values are asserted, as the same people believe that the state 
should aid the poor and also that state aid is liable to undermine the moral worth of the poor' (p. 
41).  A discursive theoretical framework appreciates the complexity of explanations about justice 
and poverty since people clearly do not blame poor people all the time for their fates but will use 
different explanations at different times.     
 
Edelman (1977) has argued that there are three ways of explaining poverty, similar to Feagin's 
(1972) typology, and that the existence of different explanations means that they  can be utilised 
flexibly in accounts.  In this respect, some of the findings of traditional studies may be useful and 
it is likely that the consistent finding of three broad explanations for poverty points to the 
dominance of these explanations in culture -- it is possible to link factor analytic work with 
discourse analyses allied to social constructionism (see Curt, 1994 for an account of Q Factor 
Analysis in this respect).  Thus it is important to see that explanations of poverty are active social 
 
 12 
constructions which, when employed, have a variety of effects.  
 
DA also helps dissolve the artificial boundary between the individual-as-explainer and the 
institution-as-explainer.  Individuals and governments may  use certain accounts in a similar way 
to warrant their conduct.  An individual may not give to charity because, they say, the 
government should be giving money to that issue.  Similarly a government may refuse foreign 
aid because, they argue, the third world government is corrupt or inefficient.    
 
Interestingly, Edelman (1977) applies his analysis not to individuals but to government 
explanations of and policies for poverty.  Revealing the effects of individual and governmental 
explanations of poverty illustrates how these explanations are crucially ideological and political. 
 For example, Radley and Kennedy (1992) show how an understanding of ideology helps to 
account for the relationship between different sectors of society and the notion of giving to 
charity.  It is likely that different discourses of poverty have different effects.  Thus an 
individualistic explanation might justify a lack of governmental attention to poverty whilst a 
societal explanation might warrant an individual's refusal to give to charity.   In exploring what 
kind of effects such accounts have, varieties of DA which are politically committed are able to 
describe the specific ideological effects different explanations have at different times.  Of course, 
it needs to be remembered that people do not simply use different discourses, they may be also 
used by them since discourses also constrain, embed and position people.  It is also possible to 
see evidence of resistance against dominant discourses (Parker, 1992a).  
 
Implications of a discursive approach 
One major implication of adopting a discursive framework is that poverty itself is seen as a 
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social construction.  This is not to deny that poverty exists (even Derrida accepts this! --  
Derrida, 1994).  Rather it is to ask questions about how poverty is defined, described and 
accounted for.  These are political matters and as with the definition of unemployment, the 
definition of poverty is a hot political topic and is contested both between polticians from 
different parties, members of the public and even between the poor and professionals (Chambers, 
1995).  Traditional research has tended to take 'poverty' as an uncomplicated given but in its very 
definition there are  a number of implicit assumptions which have ideological effects.  Thus a 
very stringent definition of poverty setting it at a very low level of income has the effect of 
suggesting there is little poverty whereas  a more liberal definition has the opposite effect.  The 
socially contested nature of poverty is played out in the domain of explanations for poverty:  is it 
down to the poor themselves or society?  These different explnations may lead to different 
policies and practices. 
 
Implications of a discursive approach:  I  Accounting for explanations 
I have argued that a discursive approach provides a more useful understanding of the way people 
explain poverty.  But does it have anything to offer traditional accounts for why people use 
certain explanations?  Here I will briefly sketch out some implications for the two dominant 
accounts of poverty explanation:  perceptual and affective.  Here I will not focus on specific texts 
as is common in many DA reports.  Rather I will be outlining the theoretical, methodological and 
empirical possibilities of a turn to discourse. 
 
i.  The weather and other stories - is it just down to honest perception? 
Third world poverty is often attributed to the weather (Furnham and Gunter, 1989; Harper et al, 
1990).  One way of understanding this might be that this simply reflects people's perceptions.  
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White (1992) has examined common sense understandings of the natural order finding a 
dominant account in which the natural world is seen to have a linear causal hierarchy with 
anthropomorphic characteristics.  At the top of this hierarchy lies the weather and the activities 
of human beings with an assumption that actions at the top level are analogous to free will.  Here 
the world is perceived to possess natural justice.  Drawing on a perceptualist account of the 
world we are led into a relatively fruitless debate about whether people's perceptions are 'honest' 
or 'motivated' and whether they are biased by information media.  Another debate would be 
concerned with whether poverty is actually due to the weather.  However, regardless of 
whichever account is 'right'2 (and this will depend on readers' political commitments) a discursive 
approach would ask what the effect is of such an explanation?  Clearly, one effect is to remove 
governmental responsibility since poverty could be seen simply as something fatalistic thus 
warranting inaction.  Such effects might serve a number of governmental interests (eg 
minimising the overseas aid budget).  
 
ii.  Do explanations reflect emotional defences? 
Another way of understanding the kind of explanations people give for poverty is to see them as 
psychological defences against emotional discomfort.  Sloan (1990) observes: 
[The Third world] is made up of three or four billion fellow human beings who will live  
and die in conditions that few 'modern' persons would tolerate for more than a few days  
or weeks.  Perhaps it is this unthinkable difference that inclines us to construe their  
existence as something separate, untouchable, even irrelevant.   
(1990, p.2) 
 
Lerner (1980) has described a number of  'rational' and 'non-rational' ways in which people 
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attempt to eliminate threats to their belief in a Just World.  Other researchers have lent credence 
to such a view in noting that  people construct different versions of the world and that most 
people are motivated to maintain relatively inaccurate views of 'reality' (Taylor, 1991).  Cohen 
(1982) has outlined similar psychological influences on attributions of cause and responsibility in 
a justice context but appears to remain agnostic about whether these influences are primarily 
cognitive or affective or both.  
 
What might a discursive approach have to offer in such a context?  Firstly it would focus on what 
implications such accounts have.  For example, Radley and Kennedy (1992) do not appeal to 
emotions as underlying causal mechanisms but simply as another kind of account.  They note 
that some people give to charity out of pity whilst others give despite their feelings.  Clearly, 
'feelings' then, do not lead in a straightforward sense to action.  Moreover, one could give a 
discursive account of emotion (see for example, Stenner and Eccleston, 1994).  Indeed 'guilt' 
could be seen as one way of accomodating the incommensurable discourses of structural 
injustice and an ethical ideology of equity.  There is thus a need to theorize 'emotional defences' 
and see them as a rhetorical resource rather than an explanation. 
 
 
Implications of a discursive approach:  II  A preliminary analysis of non-individualist 
research territories 
As well as providing a different way of viewing explanations for poverty accounts, a discursive 
approach opens the door to a whole new territory of research that might previously have been 
seen as 'non-psychological'.  A focus on discourse enables research to bridge the traditional 
individual/society divide.  When we are looking at how discourses work it is, in a sense, 
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irrelevant whether that discourse is 'produced' by an individual or by a trans-national company.  
New research territories could then include governmental and commercial rhetoric.  Here, I will 
provide an exploratory account of what a discursive framework might have to offer the analysis 
of charity and media discourses about overseas poverty.  Once again I will not be focusing on 
specific texts since space would not permit both a detailed exposition of particular texts and a 
general theoretical argument.  The news media and charitable aid agencies are two  arenas where 
poverty-related issues are regularly discussed, yet they have been the focus of relatively little 
psychological research  and what has taken place has largely been focused on individuals' 
responses to adverts (Eayrs and Ellis, 1990; Stockdale and Farr, 1987) although some discursive 
work has been done (Radley and Kennedy, 1992).   They are also the major sources of 
information on poverty for the general public -- a recent report by the Third World and 
Environment Broadcasting Project noted that 82% of Britons relied on television as their main 
source of information on the Third World (Christian Aid News, 1995);  they are also groups 
where the use of images and explanations are used to great effect; finally, they are, as I hope to 




The press and the broadcasters (eg the BBC's fund-raising venture Comic Relief) tend to focus 
less on any links between the North's1 wealth and the South's poverty, instead concentrating on 
poor individuals, the climate or corruption and inefficiency in Third World governments.  Some 
programmes do appear to be changing with, for example reports included in recent Comic Relief 
broadcasts giving some political context to famine.  However, when political issues are focused 
on (eg in the case of the Ethiopian war) no questions are asked about who the financial backers 
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and arms-suppliers to the various parties to the conflict are, nor what the history to the conflict is. 
 If questions are raised it is often only in terms of local politics and not links with First World 
agencies or governments.  The effect of such coverage is that famine becomes seen as something 
which just happens, often immediately and is not seen to be connected to political processes.  
The Western public have few explanations for poverty which are culturally available.  What then 
are the interests involved in media discourse?  One obvious interest is the need for fund-raisers to 
avoid 'political' topics in order to maintain stable revenue.  This is especially true for the BBC 
which is often under attack by the British Right for having a Left-wing bias.  However, this 
cannot be a full explanation since there is also evidence that 'news-worthiness' and dramatic 
entertainment value are powerful influences:  a recent report indicates that 90% of all television 
news and current affairs reports on Third World issues focus on conflict and disaster (Christian 
Aid News, 1995).. 
 
Sorenson (1991) has argued that there are a number of political interests and ideological 
influences on the way the mass media portray Southern poverty.  In his analysis of media 
discourse on famine in the Horn of Africa he has shown how a number of entertainment, media 
and political interests were served by particular ways of explaining and portraying the famine.  
For example a slow-onset to the Ethiopian famine was depicted as sudden and related only to 
food and famine.  Reports did not discuss the  conflict or offer a political analysis.  Sorenson 
describes such an account as one of naturalisation:   
 
Naturalisation ignores conditions of poverty, repression and conflict which allowed  
drought to be translated into famine.  Reports explaining famine as natural disaster are  




Sorenson (1991, p.226) 
 
As well as such influences, accounts contained political distortions and anti-Communist rhetoric 
-- many texts ignored previous non-Communist atrocities.  Sorenson also described some of the 
tactics used by the news media, noting the use of 'innoculation' where reports admitted either the 
extent of the famine or some level of external causation before going on to blame famine mainly 
on internal factors (eg the actions of the Ethiopians themselves) thus concealing continuing 
structural inequities.  This illustrates how contrasting accounts can be combined to serve 
particular rhetorical purposes with the effect that responsibility  was placed on African 
governments whilst Western benefactors were portrayed as benevolent.  Sorenson linked such 
discourses on poverty with wider discourses on Africa, with racist discourses and with 
victim-blaming of Africans seen in the media as 'ignorant' and 'primitive'.  The use of racist and 
colonialist views of Africans as inferior and 'other', as 'primitive', as 'noble savages' and as 
needing to be converted has a long history (Mudimbe, 1988; Parker, 1992b). 
 
Although written media texts might provide researchers with useful materials, the media's use of 
images is also potentially analytically worthwhile.  Interpretations similar to Sorenson's on media 
text could, no doubt, be applied to media images.  A British TV documentary 'Hard Times' 
(Channel 4 Television, 1991) explored how domestic poverty was portrayed in documentaries, 
dramas and news items in the media.  It reported that often very simple images of poor people 
were used and that the media often organised artificial and stereotyped situations for the cameras 




... what you do is find the worst possible example you can think of of somebody who's  
poor rather than that you find examples that exemplify ordinary, typical, everyday 
poverty. 
(Beatrix Campbell, journalist, in Channel 4 Television, 1991) 
 
Research into the effects of and reasons for the use of certain images might find that influences 
similar to those important in mobilising certain discourses of poverty explanation are at work in 
image choice as well as other more commercial interests like maintaining dramatic entertainment 
value and fostering links with advertisers. 
 
Research such as that of Sorenson reveals how limiting traditional attributional research has 
been.  In focusing on mass media texts, he demonstrates how the media are explainers too.  
Attribution researchers can only examine 'individuals' or 'groups', not organisational or societal 
discourse.  Moreover, it ignores the fact that individual subjects are not isolated from society:  
they are everyday exposed to news and entertainment media providing a rich resource of cultural 
information for people's explanations.   Discursive research  shows that the use of these 
discourses has particular effects and serves certain interests whereas attribution research would 
tend only to offer correlations of demographic variables. 
 
 
Explaining poverty and campaigning against it:  Raising money or consciousness? 
A second major area of information for the public comes from Aid Agencies who, in fact, expend 
a good deal of energy in attempting to 'put the record straight' about what they see as biased news 
reporting (Oxfam, 1985).  But what of charity literature?  Recent research questions whether this 
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is any more value-free, rather it appears to be guided by some similar interests (eg a need to both 
raise money and consciousness often in dramatic ways) and by some different ones (eg 
challenging the economic status quo) whilst being limited and constrained by other discourses 
(eg legal and political).  How are these competing interests managed in charity discourse? 
 
Most of the non-structural explanations for Third World poverty used in the Harper et al., (1990) 
study have been disputed (Haru, 1984; Mehryar, 1984; Oxfam, 1991b; Twose, 1984).  Instead, 
Oxfam (1991b) describes the major causes of poverty as:  conflict, the debt crisis, declining 
prices of commodities like tea, inadequate aid, consumption of resources by the North, 
environmental damage and lack of accountable government.  An attributional theorist adopting a 
naïvely realist point of view might try to compare individuals' attributions with the 'real' causes 
of poverty and speculate why there was a difference --  education or political preference perhaps. 
 However such a position would miss the crucial point made earlier that it is the fact that there 
are differences of view about the causes that is interesting.  Discursive research focuses on those 
differences and variations and looks for the effects of different discourses.   Discourse analysts, 
however, look not only at what is said but also at what is not said, indeed what perhaps cannot be 
said (Parker, 1992a).  What are the constraints on charity discourse? 
 
In an article examining challenges facing Oxfam, Brazier (1992) has noted that the charity exists 
in a difficult political atmosphere.  He cites a recent instance where Oxfam had been reported to 
the UK Charity Commissioners by a Conservative MP who felt that an Oxfam campaign about 
poverty in Southern Africa was politically biased.  The campaign material drew links between 
the continuing poverty of that region and South Africa's pre-1994 policy of apartheid.  The effect 
of the investigation by the Charity Commissioners was that Oxfam had to withdraw its 
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campaigning material and undertake not to be 'politically biased' in future.  This demonstrated 
that not only do explanations of poverty exist in an ideological and political context but so also 
does the information on which those explanations are based.  In other words charities are not 
'free' to choose what explanations of poverty to use in their materials but are, instead constrained 
by legal and political discourses.  As the Brazilian Archbishop Helder Camara has commented 
'When I 
 give food to the poor, they call me a saint.  When I ask why the poor have no food, they call me 
a Communist'. 
 
The effect of charities attempting to offer certain explanations for poverty is to be accused of 
being politically motivated.  One constraint on charity discourse then is the need for accounts to 
appear to be politically disinterested.  An effect of this is that such explanations do not challenge 
the dominant discourses available in culture for explaining poverty.  Once again, an ignorance of 
the politically contested nature of poverty explanation leaves the attributional researcher in  a 
social vacuum when it comes to accounting for the explanations people give, restricted as they 
are by the constraints of survey methodology.   Moreover, it shows how the choice between 
particular explanations at particular moments is not just an 'individual' one based on age, gender, 
political preference and so on, rather it is crucially social and takes place in an arena of 
competing political and ideological interests. 
 
Another influence on the kinds of explanations for poverty given by charities is whether they are 
aiming to raise money or to raise awareness about the causes of poverty.  This kind of dilemma is 
common to many charities and has proved to be an interesting area for research (Eayrs and Ellis, 
1990; Stockdale and Farr, 1987).  Aid agencies have increasingly realised that the kind of images 
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that raise funds often devalue the people portrayed and fail to address crucial issues (van de 
Gaag, 1992).  However, as one advertising executive involved in charity work has noted 'If what 
my brief is is to make people put their hands in their pocket and come up with some money then 
one has to - it's quite right to use fairly dramatic techniques in doing that' (Simon Sherwood of 
advertising company Lowe, Howard-Spink in Channel 4 Television, 1991).  Feagin (1972) 
hypothesised a link between causal explanations of poverty and policies to alleviate it, finding 
some evidence for this -- if respondents saw poverty as being due to the poor they were 
antagonistic to welfare payments.  Thus agencies may feel that in order to raise funds they need 
to portray the poor as helpless and powerless although as I noted earlier Billig et al (1988) 
argued that this was not necessarily a consistent link.  Burman (1994a, 1994b, 1994c) has argued 
that charity appeals for children in the South draw on a number of elements:  a restricted range of 
ways of relating rich and poor peoples (in the form of funding or sponsorship to helpless 
recipients); little scope for reflection on causes of these circumstances or whether they are 
portrayed accurately; and the use of dominant models of child development. Such discursive 
strategies have particular effects and can be seen as serving certain interests:  pragmatic for 
charities (in raising money) but also ideological (in policing the relationship between  rich and 
poor and so on).   Attribution research can only examine individual perceptions of poverty or Aid 
agency advertising and is not able to look at the way information about poverty is circulated or 
explore the discursive dynmaics of advertising campaigns.    
 
However, as with the South Africa campaign, Aid agencies' campaigns using such strategies 
have had the effect of attracting political criticism about their  use of images and a call both for 
more positive images of Third World peoples and an emphasis on education rather than 
fund-raising (Lyne, 1990).  As a result of such pressure, Oxfam has responded by publishing 
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both a statement of policy about the use of images (Oxfam, 1991a) and a training and educational 
package examining the effects of images (Oxfam, 1992).  However, such changes in advertising 
policy are taking place in a more difficult economic context for overseas aid charities -- in the 
UK in 1990  Oxfam was beaten in revenue terms by both the National Trust (a land-owning 
charity aiming at the preservation of old buildings and the countryside) and the Royal National 
Lifeboat Association (Coles, 1991). 
As a result of such pressures an educational discourse has become increasingly prominent in aid 
agency literature (Gill, 1988).  But what might the effects of such a change of discourse be?  
Eayrs and Ellis (1990) are more equivocal in their investigation of the effects of charity 
advertising.  Although their study focused on the portrayal of people with learning disabilities, 
implications can be drawn about charity advertising for other marginalised groups.  They argued 
that more normalising approaches have a cost in encouraging people to feel there are no 
difficulties to be faced and they suggested that agencies should aim at encouraging people to 
have direct contact with people with learning disabilities in order to overcome prejudice.  They  
also suggested a pragmatic strategy involving the use of positive images in promotional 
campaigns which some evidence suggests (Stockdale and Farr, 1987) may elicit donations 
anyway even if they are not directly requested.  
 
In conclusion then, a discursive approach is useful in elucidating some of the discourses which 
influence the kinds of explanations of poverty which circulate in culture and in tracing the effects 
of such accounts and the interests served by them.  Particular varieties of DA can also begin to 
describe the ideological and institutional interests served by different explanations and  their use 
in specific contexts.  Moreover it is important for the politically committed analyst to tie their 
analyses in with social and political critiques.  The tendency to relativism in DA could be seen as 
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a limitation in dealing with 'real' issues like poverty however it can also lead to a more critical 




There have been a number of calls for psychologists to become more involved in the difficulties 
facing the poor South (Adler, 1990; Martín-Baró3, 1994; Sloan, 1990).  However, there is a need 
to be reflective in responding to such calls given many of the neo-colonialist assumptions in 
notions of 'giving psychology away' to the Third World (Moghaddam and Taylor, 1986).  
Previous psychological research on poverty has focused on the poor themselves or on the 
perceptions of poverty of members of the public.  Harper (1991) has argued there is a need to 
examine the systems that maintain poverty.  As part of such research it would be important to 
explore the public explanations and images of poverty generated by  major organisations which I 
would see as poverty-creating systems (eg national governments, the International Monetary 
Fund, Trans-National Corporations, the World Bank and so on) and attempt to expose the 
differences between political rhetoric and actual practice as campaigns surrounding the debt 
crisis have sought to do. 
 
There is a need, I have argued, for future psychological research into poverty explanations to 
have a broader focus, utilising a discursive framework.  This might provide a more adequate 
understanding of such explanations and  also extend research beyond merely individualistic 
accounts to include the texts and images both produced by individuals and organisations and in 
which those individuals and organisations are themselves located.  It is to be hoped that future 
research aiming to de-mystify explanations of poverty and explore their ideological and 
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psychological contexts will contribute towards conscientización (Martín-Baró, 1994) and the 
fight of the poor of the South against the institutionalized poverty and racism that has been the 
consequence of 500 years of colonialism (Parker, 1992b). 
 
Footnotes 
1.  The terms 'first world' and 'third world' are not intended as derogatory and are used here 
because they are widely understood.  I have also used the terms 'North' and 'South' to refer to rich 
countries of the Northern hemisphere and poorer countries of the Southern hemisphere. 
 
2.  I would agree with Twose (1984) who argues that Britain's winter is as bad as Third World 
climactic extremes with the difference that Britain is economically able to meet the demands of 
the winter whilst Third World countries often cannot.  Solomon Inquai has commented that 
'hunger is about politics, not the weather' (Oxfam, 1983). 
 
3.  Ignacio Martín-Baró was a Latin American social psychologist and Jesuit priest.  He was 
assassinated by El Salvadorean government troops from the US - trained Atlacatl battalion on 
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Table 1.  The overall means and standard deviations for items of the Causes of Third 
World Poverty Questionnaire (from Harper et al., 1990)                                                     
 
Mean    (SD) 
                                                                       
There is poverty in Third World countries becausea: 
 
1. The people of such countries keep having too 
many children1      3.20    (1.25) 
 
2. Of fate1       2.32    (1.01) 
 
3. Their governments are corrupt2    3.64    (0.94) 
 
4. Of the regional climate     3.76    (0.92) 
 
5. Their governments are inefficient2    3.82    (0.82) 
 
6. Of laziness and a lack of effort in the 
population of such countries1     2.18    (1.02) 
 
7. Their land is not suitable for agriculture3   3.42    (1.02) 
 
8. Other countries exploit the Third World4   3.81    (1.16) 
 
9. Of disease in Third World countries    3.56    (0.96) 
 
10. Their governments spend too much money on arms2  3.64    (1.04) 
 
11. Of war       3.60    (0.96) 
 
12. Of the world economy and banking systems 
being loaded against the poor4    3.57   (1.11) 
 
13. Pests and insects destroy crops    3.64  (0.78) 
 
14. The population of such countries make no 
attempt at self-improvement1     2.55  (1.09) 
 
15. Of a lack of intelligence among the people 
there1        2.85   (1.26) 
 
16. Of a lack of thrift and proper management 
of resources by the people there1    3.09    (1.15) 
 
17. The people there are not willing to 
change old ways and customs1    3.24  (1.00) 
18. Of a lack of ability among the people 
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of such countries1      2.41    (1.13) 
                                     
 
 
a Strongly agree=5, strongly disagree=1 
 
1 Items loading uniquely and significantly on 'Blame Poor' factor 
 
2 Items loading uniquely and significantly on 'Blame Third World Governments' factor 
 
3 Item loading uniquely and significantly on 'Blame Nature' factor 
 
4 Items loading uniquely and significantly on 'Blame Exploitation' factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
